The offensive punch
July 18, 1941 near the town of Yelnya (Smolensk region) were German tanks. After capturing the city, the 10th Panzer Division, marching in the vanguard of the 46th motokorpusa 2nd Panzer Group Guderian, could not advance further. Yelnya was strategically important settlement, which is located near the German and Soviet military units that are part of the defensive battle of Smolensk and Vyazma defensive operation. Commander of the Reserve Front Georgy Zhukov, after it became clear that German troops would be difficult to go further, ordered the commander of the 24th Army, Major-General KI Rakutina develop a plan organized and offensive strike, which would eliminate Elninskaya ledge, threatening defense and rear of the Red Army.
In addition to being in the area of the 24th Army was and 43rd Army, created from divisions who came to front of the various military districts and hastily replenished companies of marching under the command of Major General DM Seleznev. On the German side were several armies: 4th Army Field Marshal G. von Kluge, the 9th Army Corps G. Geyer, the 7th Army Corps V. Farmbahera, as well as in the reserve had 10 Panzer Division. Total enemy group consisted of about 70 thousand. Soldiers and officers, 500 guns and mortars 75 mm and above and about 40 tanks. The first echelon of the Soviet Reserve Front was represented by two armies, include: 19, 100, 106, 107, 120, 303 and 309 th Infantry Division, 6th Infantry Division of the People’s Militia, 103 th motorized division, the 102nd and 105 panzer division, as well as the 10 corps artillery regiments. In total there were about 60 thousand. Man.
Force sides were about equal, but the Soviet troops were surrounded by German troops. Need was operational plan of attack.
Plans parties
The idea of the Soviet plan is to apply counter-punches with a base formed projection of the north and the south, which stretches for several kilometers and then in an attempt to break through the enemy defenses and developing offensive to surround the main German forces. Also provided dissection enemy forces blow from the east and destroy it piecemeal. Thus, the basis of the plan was the decisive operational maneuver – sided coverage to encircle and defeat the enemy in pieces. According to the directive, sent by Georgy Zhukov in front of the headquarters of the Reserve August 26, the operation must be completed by 8 September, which actually happened.
The commander of the 24th Army, General KI Rakutin almost immediately began to mobilize the command staff and the organization to start an offensive. Breakthrough projection and a further defeat of the German troops was made to carry the forces of nine infantry divisions of the thirteen that existed in the army. Quickly create two strike groups, each of which consisted of five divisions – north (two infantry and one armored division) and southern (infantry and motorized divisions). From them it was to follow the first blow. On the northern assault group, which consisted of 102 Panzer, 107th and 100th Infantry Divisions, the main hopes pinned. Each of them has been strengthened with powerful artillery regiments and two batteries of rocket launchers (BM-13). In total, the northern group had about 400 guns and mortars 76 mm and above, almost half of which was strengthening artillery.
South Strike Group composed of 303-th Infantry and the 106th motorized divisions, which also had to a gain of about 100 guns and mortars. It is also an important role, in accordance with the plan, the withdrawal of the central group, numbering two infantry divisions under the command of Major-General JG Nyquist and Colonel NA Ilyantseva.
Their attack on Yelnya was supposed to lead from the east, which would cut the environmental forces in the parts and in collaboration with other divisions to destroy them.
As for the plans of the German side, the head of the German General Staff, Colonel-General F. Halder called the fighting in the Yelnya typical example of trench warfare. In order to counter the Soviet mobile Infantry Division, the Germans were forced to withdraw its troops from the mobile Elninskaya projection. With regard to the plan of attack or defense, that, as evidenced in his diary of the army group commander of the “Center” Field Marshal von Bock, the German command until recently did not know how to act correctly:
“it is difficult to give a definitive answer to the question, what is better: to keep the protrusion or leave it. If Russian will continue to attack the ledge, then keep it profitable. But if they cease attacks that may well be, then the projection is worth preserving, because it will not only become a reference point for our further attacks in the east, but also give an opportunity to provide specific cover for the Smolensk railway junction and highway Smolensk – Moscow “.
artillery grouping
For the operation Soviet command decided to form a special artillery group, consisting of an army group of long-range (ADD) and support groups of infantry (PP) in the divisions . This was done for a more active shelling. To make artillery support method consistent concentration of fire was used. Air support was missing completely due to the fact that all the combat aircraft of the front to the beginning of the operation on the orders of the central command were transferred to the Bryansk Front, with the exception of 20 aircraft left in the interest of the 24th Army for reconnaissance and correction of artillery fire.
Getting ready to start operations in the end lasted just over four days, which, of course, was not enough.
The divisions are staffed by 70-80%, equipping troops – only 25-50%. Unable to save the required amount of ammunition and, as a result, as subsequent events showed, on the second day of the operation was felt an acute shortage of them. Thus, the balance of forces to the beginning of hostilities was as follows: People – 1.1: 1 in favor of the enemy artillery – 1.6: 1 in favor of the Soviet units
Stages of operation and its progress
All Elninskaya offensive operation can be divided into three stages: the first stage was conducted breakthrough projections on the axes of the main attacks from 30 to 31 August, at the second stage, the most difficult, the Soviet troops had to repel a fierce counterattack the enemy, who sought to disrupt the offensive 24 th army from 1 to 3 September. Finally, at the final stage of the operation it was the onset of the main phase of its development, which consists in the pursuit of retreating enemy, and in the elimination of the ledge with 4 to 8 September.
Almost simultaneously, a 30-minute period, at 7.30 and 8.00 30 August, respectively, the two Soviet armies began their offensive. 24 Army, despite the heavy fog and poor visibility, brought down fire on enemy defenses. It is possible to start mobilizing artillery forces. Then, at 8:00 Soviet tanks of the 102nd Armored Division attacked the enemy, but due to the fact that the infantry behind, unable to build on this success. In addition to operational support infantry Soviet intelligence also manifested itself not with the best hand, so that was not completely opened fire into the enemy’s defense system, particularly in relation to anti-tank, which gave the enemy an opportunity and time to recover and fight back. The weakness of the first two Soviet attacks confirm the figures: all in the attacks were killed and 10 anti-tank guns, 12 machine guns and two cannon bunker Nazis destroyed. In general, compounds of the northern group of the first day of the fight progressed only 500 meters.
The next day, 31 August, fighting continued. German troops offered stubborn resistance, not letting go far Soviet divisions. Only the 107th Infantry Division to the end of the day managed to break through the enemy’s defenses, advancing up to 2 km in depth. The reasons for the slow pace of Soviet troops lie in several factors.
First, as already noted, the Soviet intelligence at this stage of the war was still poorly developed, and secondly, material equipment of artillery, especially ammunition, was weak. Finally, there were some problems in the command organization, establishing an effective system of using infantry and tank maneuvers.
There have also been cases of desertion of the place, which undermined morale. But Soviet troops were forced to mobilize all their forces and start the next resistance has changed dramatically in the next few days.
heroism, courage and bravery
As a result of several successful attempts to counter-attack the German troops. On the heroism and courage of Soviet soldiers personally wrote to the former commander of the Reserve Front Georgy Zhukov:
«Especially courageously fought our 19, 100 and 107-th division. I have seen from the observation point division commander of the 107th Division, PV Mironova, an unforgettable picture of a fierce battle Infantry Regiment, commanded by IM Nekrasov. Polk IM Nekrasov hair rapidly captured the village, but was surrounded. He fought for three days. With the support of other parts of the 107-th division, artillery and aviation regiment not only broke the environment, but also crushed the opposing enemy, capturing at the same time an important reference point -. The railway station »
You can also give an example actions of the 586th Infantry regiment, 107th Infantry division under the leadership of Colonel IM Nekrasov. Being wounded, the Colonel continued to direct the actions of their departments, ordered to organize a defensive perimeter, personnel burrow into the ground, and the whole regiment of artillery advanced to direct fire at the tanks, which brought the results.
«detachment Ivanov” and the outcome of the operation
More August 31 the commander of the 24th army, General KI Rakutin to continue the offensive decided to establish on the basis of existing units 102, 107 and 100th divisions combined unit as part of Panzer Group, Airborne company, motobatalona and art group of 10 guns. Its task was to make a swift kick in the direction of the cages, Bol. Nezhody, go to the district Novo-Tishovo, Petrov cut the highway Elnya – Baltutino, as well as to organize a defensive perimeter and prevent the approach of enemy reserves to Yelnya. Launched hastily improvised mobile army group called “detachment Ivanov” was put into action on September 3 but failed to develop an offensive squad due to heavy air strikes and heavy German artillery fire. But thanks to the courageous actions of other Soviet military units, such as the 100th Infantry Division, the northern and southern groups by the end of the day and was able to gradually push Elninskaya narrow ledge up to 6-8 km.
As a result of his heroism and courage of Soviet troops of the 24th army from September 3 German troops gradually began to withdraw its main forces of Elninskaya bag.
Realizing this, the Soviet command ordered as soon as possible to complete the enemy encirclement and capture Yelnia.
To do this, the battle was put a powerful 127-th Infantry Division. But despite the fact that the Soviet troops crossed slowly to the pursuit of the enemy, on the flanks of the front did not ensure security. By the end of September 5 100th Infantry Division took Chaptsovo (Yelnya north), and the 19th Infantry Division entered Yelnya. By 6 September Elnya was completely liberated by Soviet troops. By the end of September 8th Division of the 24th Army eliminated the remaining Elninskaya foothold and went to the defense line on the Newly line. Jakovljevic, New Tishovo, Kukuyev. On the same day, the Soviet Information Bureau reported:
«On the Smolensk direction are 26-day battle for the city Yelnya. The remains of the enemy division hasty retreat to the west. Our troops occupied the city Yelnya, our aircraft continued to strike at the enemy troops on the battlefield and destroying aircraft at its airfields ».
The main outcome of the operation was the elimination Elninskaya projection. It improved the operational position of troops of the 24th army and the whole front of the Reserve, and was eliminated the threat of invasion by German troops in the depth of the Soviet defense and logistics. But in general, the entire plan, formulated by the Soviet command before starting the operation, could not be implemented. Destruction of the projection is not accompanied by a further offensive, due to the fact that not enough money and effort in the army, until now no clear interaction between the infantry and tanks. But at the same time it is worth noting that Elninskaya offensive was one of the first in the Great Patriotic War, during which experience was first used by operational maneuver in the short term, create temporary strike groups, endowed with specific goals and objectives.
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